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The Applicability of the Doctrine In Pari Delicto to
a 10b-5 Action
In pari delicto, literally meaning "of equal fault," is one of the
common law doctrines fashioned to assure that wrongdoers will not
profit from their own wrongdoing.' Generally applied to contract
actions,' this concept bars a party from recovering damages if his
losses were substantially caused by activities in which the law for-
bade him to engage.3 Presently, the courts are in disagreement as
to the applicability of in pari delicto to alleged violations of section
10(b)4 of the Securities Exchange Act and correspondingly to rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission. Its application typi-
cally arises in factual contexts where the parties invest in various
1. See 3 J. POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE, § 940 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as
POMEROYJ. See also 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1536-37 (2d ed. 1962) [herein-
after cited as CORBIN]; 14 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 6764 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
2. See POMEROY, supra note 1, at § 940.
3. For application of in pari delicto to different types of situations, see Gray v. Boston
Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149, 153 (1873) (in pari delicto discussed in relation to indemnifica-
tion); Wheldan v. Chapel, 8 R.I. 230 (1865) (plaintiff's illegal conduct considered in relation
to an action for conversion).
4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), provides in part
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce. . . or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
5. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978),
was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
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securities based upon the inside information of "insiders."6 When
or if the tippees,7 the investing party, discover that the inside infor-
mation is false, they may attempt to recover their losses by filing
suit against the insiders pursuant to rule 10b-5 to recover their
losses. The defendant-insiders would contend, conversely, that the
plaintiffs' misconduct, i.e., their acts of dealing in securities based
upon inside information, places the tippees in pari delicto and bars
any recovery.
This comment will explore the elements of the pari delicto defense
in relation to rule 10b-5 and examine judicial consideration of the
applicability of the defense. Further, it will be argued that similar
policies also underlie the private enforcement of rule 10b-5 and the
antitrust laws. It will be concluded, therefore, that the Supreme
Court decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp.' and its progeny,9 which in certain circumstances allow the in
pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, support the application of
the defense in 10b-5 suits.
I. RELEVANT FACTORS IN A CONSIDERATION OF in pari delicto
Generally, courts which have considered the in pari delicto de-
fense have concluded that the defense will be applied only after it
has been shown that the parties were equally at fault10 and that the
public interest would be furthered by the application of the de-
fense." However, underlying these factors are two seemingly con-
flicting policies.' 2 First, the deceptive and manipulative practices of
6. In order to determine if one is an insider, two principal elements must be examined.
First there must be the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone. Secondly an inherent unfairness must exist where a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. In re Cady,
Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
7. Tippees are "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust . Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For a discussion of the implications of tippee
status, see VI L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3561-69 (Supp. 1969).
8. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See notes 78-91 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 95-98 and accompanying text infra.
10. See generally CORBIN, supra note 1, at § 1537.
11. See POMEROY, supra note 1, at § 941.
12. For a discussion of these policies, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and
Contribution, 5 SEC. L. REV. 573 (1973).
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the tipper and tippee must be deterred 3 and, second, the tippee-
plaintiff, as a member of the investing public, should be able to
recover when wronged. Before these conflicting policies are ex-
plored, a review of the major decisions in'this area will illustrate how
each court dealt with the interplay between these factors and the
underlying policy considerations.
A. Judicial Background
Kuehnert v., Texstar Corporation4
In January, 1965, Texstar Corporation had begun negotiating a
merger agreement with Coronet Petroleum Company. The president
of Texstar told Kuehnert, the plaintiff, about these acquisition
plans and also of putative discoveries of oil on Coronet land that
would generate dividends of three dollars a year as well as an enor-
mous increase in the value of the stock. As a result of these represen-
tations, Kuehnert bought a substantial amount of Texstar stock.
However, because the representations were false, Kuehnert sus-
tained substantial losses on his investment.
To recover these losses Kuehnert filed suit 5 against Texstar and
its president alleging violations of section 10(b)"6 of the Securities
and Exchange Act. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment, holding that Kuehnert's own misconduct as a tippee pre-
cluded his recovery under rule 10b-5.' 1
Affirming the district court, 9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit adopted a two-step approach. First, the court
questioned the appropriateness of in pari delicto, but concluded
that Kuehnert's knowing and voluntary participation in an illegal
13. Id.
14. 286 F. Supp. 340, 342 (S.D. Tex. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
15. The plaintiff sought as damages the difference between what he paid for the stock and
the price for which they were sold. Id. at 343.
16. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
17. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
18. The district court's holding was threefold. First the court characterized the plaintiff'
as a tippee and concluded that if a person has access to inside information, this person should
be subject to the same duties as an insider. 286 F. Supp. at 345. Further the court maintained
that the Act and the corresponding rule were not enacted to protect tippees. Id. Lastly the
district court concluded, without discussion, that the defense of inpari delicto is valid against
the plaintiffs. Id.
19. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
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scheme made the defense available.2 1 Second, the court considered
whether application or nonapplication of this defense would better
promote the objectives of the securities laws by increasing the pro-
tection to the investing public.2 1 Initially, the court acknowledged
that application of in pari delicto might foster future insider-tipper
falsehoods. 2 However, the court determined that this consideration
was outweighed by the danger of giving a tippee an enforceable
warranty that all secret information is true. 23 Thus, the majority 4
concluded that in pari delicto should be applied to leave the tippees
with the restraint that arises from the fear of irretrievable loss
should they act upon a tip which proves to be false. 25
20. Id. at 704. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Kuehnert from those cases where the
plaintiff had only mere knowledge of the defendant's wrongdoing without active participa-
tion. Id. at 703. See Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964)
(plaintiff's conduct did not bar her from bringing action for the alleged sale of unregistered
securities); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1960) (a corporation induced through fraud into parting with 700,000
shares of stock was not a knowing party to the fraud); In re Calton Crescent, Inc. 173 F.2d
944 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949) (pur-
chasers of insolvent corporation's debentures who purchased on director's tip were not
"knowingly confederating" with director in breach of trust since the debentures were pur-
chased long before the petition for bankruptcy was filed); Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818,
822 (3d Cir., 1941) (mere fact that plaintiff knew of the defendant's illegal actions and
intended to profit from them is not enough to bar the plaintiff's action under the Securities
Exchange Act).
21. 412 F.2d at 704. The purpose of the securities laws was to produce fair and honest
markets, and to restore investor confidence by requiring high standards of conduct in securi-
ties transactions. Heisher, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment in SELECTED ARTICLES
iN FEDERAL SECuRTES LAw 871, 896 (1968). The securities laws enacted by Congress in 1933
and 1934 were Congress' response to the grave national economic crisis and widespread abuses
which existed in the securities markets at that time. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
SECURTiES ACT OF 1933 AND TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMrTTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 77th Cong. ist Sess., 8-30 (1942).
-22. 412 F.2d at 705. The court stated, "It is true that if a tippee has no remedy against
an insider's private falsehoods, little deterrent against such conduct will exist.
23. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
24. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Godbold recognized that a private suit may be the
most important weapon in attainment of the policies underlying the Act and the Rule. 412
F.2d at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting). See A. BROMBERG, SECURIrIEs LAw: FRAuD-SEC RULE
10A-5, § 8.1, at 194 (1968). Further the dissent maintained that the best way to stop the
misuse of confidential information is to discourage the insider-tipper from making his initial
release. 412 F.2d at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
25. See Note, Securities Regulations: Doctrines of In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands
Held to Bar 10b-5 Recovery By Tippee Against Corporate Insider, 1969 DUKE L.J. 832
[hereinafter cited as In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands].
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Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc."5
Between August 12, 1968, and November 8, 1968, Mr. and Mrs.
Nathanson purchased securities of TST Industries, Inc. The Na-
thansons bought these securities relying upon the inside information
of defendant's agent that, upon the proposed merger with another
corporation, the TST securities would double in value. Because the
proposed merger never occurred, the Nathansons sued to recover
losses sustained by them in their purchase of the securities.
The defendant, a securities brokerage firm, filed a motion for
summary judgment 27 pursuant to Rule 562 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, contending as a defense, that the plaintiffs were
barred from recovery under the doctrine of in pari delicto.
In denying the motion, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York followed the Kuehnert approach that
the initial focus should be whether the allowance or disallowance of
this defense would better serve the purpose of the securities laws.2
However, the district court did not adopt the further reasoning of
Kuehnert. Instead, the court maintained the insider-tipper bore a
greater degree of fault than the tippee ° and presented a greater
potential threat to public investors. 31 The court reasoned that in
order to restrict the use of all material inside information, the insi-
der, as the fountainhead of these confidential disclosures, must be
discouraged. 32 Thus, the court concluded that this discouragement
26. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
27. Id. at 51.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Rule 56(b) provides: "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof."
29. 325 F. Supp. at 53.
30. Id. at 57. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 5 SEc. L. Rxv. 573,
589-94 (1973), where it was suggested that Kuehnert focused upon the deterrence policy, while
the Nathanson court used a degree of fault analysis.
31. Id. See notes 52-63 and accompanying text infra.
32. 325 F. Supp. at 57. But see Note, Caveat Tippor: Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Connor,
Inc., 33 U. PrrT. L. Rev. 103, 108 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Caveat Tipporl, where it has
been suggested that sufficient sanctions already exist to discourage "opportunistic utiliza-
tion" of inside information by an insider. Among those sanctions are criminal prosecution,
15 U.S.C. §§ 775(b), and 78u(e) (1970), and the possibility of being jointly and severally liable
where a third party investor is defrauded by a tippee trading on the basis of inside informa-
tion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77K(f), and 78i(e) (1970).
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can be most readily achieved by refusing to apply the defense of in
pari delicto.3
Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank34
Beginning in November 1971, Mialki, an officer of Pittsburgh
National Bank and manager of a branch office, released inside infor-
mation to the plaintiff, one of the bank's customers.35 Mialki in-
formed the plaintiff that a merger between two corporations was
imminent and that the Bank was investing heavily in the securities
of both companies. On the strength of this information, the plaintiff
purchased the stock of one of these corporations. However, the infor-
mation was untrue, the merger never occurred, and the plaintiff
sued to recoup the loss on his investment. Because the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted the defendant's summary judgment,3 the plaintiff appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Initially the court examined the degree of the plaintiff's miscon-
duct as well as the causal relationship of his misconduct to his loss,
and maintained that the plaintiff's voluntary actions were sufficient
to bring into play the concept of in pari delic to.37 However, the court
did not stop there; it further considered whether the recognition of
in pari delicto would advance the public interest. Examining both
Kuehnert and Nathanson, the court decided in favor of the applica-
tion of in pari delicto. This conclusion was premised on the fact that
elimination of in pari delicto would deter only the relaying of false
33. 325 F. Supp. at 57-58. See Avery v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F.
Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971) and Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
In both cases it was held that mere knowledge of a securities regulation violation was not
enough to invoke the defense of in pari delicto. This rationale has been criticized: "It is
difficult, indeed, to perceive a public benefit from giving a wrongdoer blanket permission to
recoup losses incurred as a result of his own fraudulent activity." Caveat Tippor, supra note
32, at 111.
34. 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1978).
35. There were actually three individual plaintiffs in this action who purchased securities
relying on Mr. Mialki's statements.
36. 555 F.2d at 1156.
•37. Id. at 1162. The court recognized that the parties were not co-conspirators in the usual
sense, since a joint program of illegal conduct was never agreed upon or even contemplated.
Id. Nonetheless the court focused upon the voluntariness of the plaintiff's action in finding
him as "equally at fault." Id. For lob-5 suits where the parties could be considered co-
conspirators, see James v. Dubreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Hogan v. Teledyne, 328 F.
Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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information by insiders and would have no effect on the flow of true
inside information. 8 Moreover, the court noted that substantial de-
terrents to tippers are provided by possible SEC and criminal ac-
tions as well as by nontippee purchasers and sellers. On the other
hand, the court realized that the threat of in pari delicto would
eliminate the warranty of accuracy of the tip. Accordingly, the court
concluded that recognition of in pari delicto would not detract from
the aim of discouraging tippers,39 and would, in fact, deter tippees
from using this information."
B. Equality of Fault
The equality of fault standard has often been utilized by the
courts to deny the application of in pari delicto to securities regula-
tions situations. For example, in Can-Am Petroleum Company v.
Beck" a plaintiff who sustained losses on her purchase of misrepre-
sented,4 2 unregistered 3 securities and who had previously and reck-
lessly assisted the corporate defendant in other sales of these securi-
ties" was not barred by in pari delicto. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit maintained that the plaintiff never
reached the same degree of culpability as did the defendant. Fur-
ther, the court concluded that refusal of relief to the plaintiff who
is less culpable than defendant would result in harmful effects
wholly out of proportion to the requirements of individual punish-
ment or the discouragement of illegal contracts. 5 Similarly, in
38. 555 F.2d at 1163.
39. It is indeed questionable whether the threat of inside information would forestall
tippers from spreading inside information in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), where it was held that a showing of scienter is a prerequisite to private recoveries
under rule 10b-5.
40. 555 F.2d at 1163-64.
41. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
42. "Any person who . . . sells a security . . . by means of. . . oral communications,
which include an untrue statement of a material fact . . . shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security .... " 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
43. Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly to make use of interstate commerce to further the sale of
such security. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
44. 331 F.2d at 373. Not only did the plaintiff personally invest in the securities, but also
actively participated in efforts to sell the securities to other persons.
45. See Comment, Plaintiff's Conduct As A Bar To Recovery Under The Securities Acts:
In Pari Delicto, 48 TEx. L. REV. 181, 184 (1969), where the plaintiff's illegal conduct in Beck
was characterized as directly involved with the securities violation but unequal in fault when
compared with defendant's conduct. For similarly characterized conduct, see Hoxsey v.
1978-79
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Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,46 the plaintiff brought suit for
losses sustained as a result of the defendant's violation of section
7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193411 and correspondingly
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System. 8 Acknowledging that
the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's violation of the margin
requirements,"' the court concluded that the plaintiff's mere knowl-
edge of the violationsw would not prevent him from successfully
asserting a claim against the defendant. 5'
In 10b-5 situations, the equality of fault standard has been inter-
preted as requiring that the fault of the parties be mutual, simulta-
neous, and relatively equal.5 Despite this uniformly accepted test,
the courts have reached inconsistent results 3 as to the relative de-
Beaird, 287 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (plaintiff invested in securities relying upon
confidential information that proved false); Miller v. California Roofing Co. 55 Cal. App. 2d
136, 130 P.2d 740 (1942) (plaintiff attempted to purchase shares of stock before the corpora-
tion obtained a permit to issue stock).
46. 527 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. Section 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1970), provides that "lilt shall be unlawful for any
member of a national securities exchange . . . to extend or maintain credit . .. on any
security .. in contravention of the rules and regulations. . . of the Federal Reserve System
48. Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1978), provides in part
that in case a customer who purchases a security does not make full cash payment for it
within 7 days, the creditor shall promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction or the
unsettled portion thereof. Id. § 220.4(c)(2). For a more detailed discussion of Regulation T,
see Kelly & Webb, Credit and Securities: The Margin Requirements, 24 Bus. LAW 1153
(1969); Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Civil Remedies Based upon Illegal Exten-
sion of Credit in Violation of Regulation T, 61 MICH. L. Rxv. 940 (1963).
49. The margin requirements are contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 220-21 (1978). Section 220 is
referred to as Regulation T. See note 45 supra. Section 221 is referred to as Regulation U
which governs loans by banks for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered securities.
50. In a prior opinion of this same case by this court of appeals, emphasis was placed on
the fact that the federally imposed margin requirements forbade a broker to extend undue
credit but did not forbid customers from accepting such credit. Pearlstein v. Scudder &
German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970). However, the addition of § 7(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act in 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (1970), as well as Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 224
(1978), have now made it unlawful to obtain credit in violation of the margin requirements.
Thus these amendments cast doubt on the viability of the prior decision. See also Comment,
Civil Liability for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f) and Regulation X, 43
FORDHAM L. REv. 93 (1974).
51. 527 F.2d at 1146. See Spoon v. Walston & Co., 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (in an
action for the violation of the margin requirements the district court may allow for less than
100 per cent recovery when broker is found to have made false statements, but purchaser has
actively participated in the false statements).
52. Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 944
(1976).
53. As was suggested in Tarasi, one possible reason for this inconsistency is that securities
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gree of fault of tippers and tippees.' The Nathanson court main-
tained that very rarely could the tippees and tippers be considered
"of equal fault." The Nathanson approach looked at the status of
the parties in relation to their effect on the investing public;5" the
tipper was the fountainhead of the confidential information,
whereas the tippee was only the recipient. Acknowledging that both
tipper and tippee were in a position to take advantage of the public
investor, the Nathanson court nevertheless maintained that the tip-
pee's potential for harm was minimal compared to that of the origi-
nal source of the leak.58
On the other hand, the Kuehnert and Tarasi courts looked to the
conduct57 of the tipper and tippee in relation to each other to deter-
mine the degree of fault of each. As the tipper violated rule 10b-5
by releasing the information to the tippee, the tippee correspond-
ingly violated this regulation by investing, relying upon insider in-
formation."8 While it was acknowledged that this situation did not
represent a case of co-conspiracy, it did show that the parties jointly
and voluntarily participated in the wrongdoing.59
Concluding that the parties are equally at fault as was done in
Kuehnert and Tarasi represents a more realistic view of the prob-
lem. Recognizing that measuring fault is more difficult in 10b-5
situations than in other areas of the law,"0 it must be acknowledged
cases do not provide for a straight-forward setting for measuring the relative faults of the
parties. While the infractions of the parties are linked, they are not based upon any agreement
between the parties. 555 F.2d at 1161-62.
54. Professor Chaffee suggests that while the fault of the plaintiff is often an important
element in the judicial settlement of disputes, courts should not be oversensitive to the ethical
conduct of the plaintiff. See Chaffee, Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L.
REv. 1065, 1091-92 (1949).
55. 325 F. Supp. at 57. See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). In
Serzysko the plaintiff-borrower brought an action under Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1978),
for the lender's failure to use reasonable diligence to discover the borrower's unlawful purpose
for a loan. The court held that to permit the borrower to recover would have been interpreted
by the public as encouraging unlawful borrowing.
56. 325 F. Supp. at 57. The point apparently being made by the Nathanson court is that
the tippor's potential for harm is much greater since he has many more opportunities to
release the inside information.
57. In Kuehnert it was stated thatactual illegal conduct should bar recovery. 412 F.2d at
703. The Tarasi court focused on whether the unlawful conduct of the plaintiffs was of
sufficient magnitude to bar recovery. 555 F.2d at 1161.
58. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
59. 555 F.2d at 1162.
60. Tarasi stated that the infractions of the tipper and tippee were linked but not based
1978-79
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that each time a tipper releases information to the tippee, there are
two equally justiciable actions under rule 10b-5. First, the public
investor could sue the tipper for his initial release of the inside
information.6 ' Secondly, the tippee could be sued for his failure to
divulge the information to the public, as well as for his act of invest-
ing while relying on the information. 2 Further the contention of the
Nathanson court that the tipper's potential for harm was greater
than that of the tippee ignores the fact that once the tippee obtains
the information he has the same potential for releasing it as does
the original tipper. Because of this equal propensity to divulge the
information, the investing public must fear the action of both par-
ties.6 3
Lastly, and most importantly, any harm that is suffered by the
investing public is the result of the action of both parties. The
tipper's divulging the information without more is merely precipi-
tous. If no tippee acts on his release by investing or further releasing,
no harm is caused to the investing public. Accordingly, the harm
emanates from a release by the tipper and resulting illegal action
of the part of the tippee. Thus, although either tipper or tippee can
be sued under 10b-5, it is apparent that harm is necessarily created
by the conduct of both parties.
Furtherance of the Public Interest
The purpose underlying the enactment of § 10b and rule 10b-5
was to equalize the bargaining power of investors. 4 Congress and the
Securities Exchange Commission maintained that by requiring the
insider and the tippee to disclose the information or refrain from
trading, any possibilities of an unfair advantage over the unin-
upon any agreement between them. Because of this, the court continued, the notion of
equality was hard to conceptualize. Id. at 1161-62.
61. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), (involves several different types of insider-
tippers).
62. For an example of tippee liability, see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
63. The "equally reprehensible" language was used by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulfur. Since the tippees in Texas Gulf Sulfur were not
being sued in the action, the court stated only that their conduct was "equally reprehensible."
401 F.2d at 853.
64. See Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); 3 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1455-56 (2d ed. 1961).
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formed investing public would be eliminated. 5 Moreover, the courts
have applied this policy broadly"6 to hold that anyone 7 who has
obtained inside information 8 is subject to civil liability under rule
10b-5.
The lack of uniformity the courts are experiencing as to the appl-
icability of in pari delicto to 10b-5 stems from the fact that both
non-recognition and recognition of the defense will further the pub-
lic interest in equalization of bargaining power in certain respects.69
If the defense is applied, tippees are deterred from investing; if it is
not applied tippers are deterred from releasing the information.
Thus in considering the appropriateness of the defense, the deter-
rent impact of both alternatives must be weighed against each
other. First, without the defense a tippee is in effect given an en-
forceable warranty on his investment, 70 while the tipper is only min-
imally deterred. If the tip is accurate, causing the value of the
security to rise, the tippee has illegally reaped profits. On the other
hand, if the tip is false and the price of the securities decreases, the
tippee can bring suit for his trading losses pursuant to rule lOb-5.
With respect to the deterrence upon tippers, nonrecognition of the
defense will only affect the release of false information.7 If the tip-
per knows his information to be true, he need not ponder the likeli-
hood of a 10b-5 suit being brought against him by a tippee.
Alternatively, recognition of in pari delicto would appear to have
a greater deterrent impact upon potential 10b-5 violations. While
65. Id. See also Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 Mim. L. REv. 607,
614 (1964). It was suggested that, given adequate information, a true market value for a
security can be established through the law of supply and demand in combination with each
purchaser acting in his own interest.
66. The broad interpretation given to rule 10b-5 was contemplated by its drafters. See
Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law
Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1383-90 (1965).
67. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971),
it was stated that rule 10b-5 may include employers as well as officers, directors, and control-
ling stockholders who are in possession of material, undisclosed information.
68. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), defined inside information as
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone.
69. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 965 (1977). Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
70. 412 F.2d at 705.
71. See In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands, supra note 25, at 839.
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not encouraging or discouraging the release of true inside informa-
tion by tippers, recognition of the defense deters tippees in their
decisions to invest. The tippees realize that any losses will be suf
fered without recourse against the tipper." Faced with the uncer-
tainty as to the veracity of their tip, tippees will be less likely to
assume such risks and thus will be deterred from investing.
II. THE ANTITRUST ANALOGY: THE RELEVANCE OF Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v.* International Parts Corp. IN THE 103-5 SETTING
In reaching their result, the courts in Kuehnert, Nathanson, and
Tarasi considered the relevance of Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. In-
ternational Parts Corp.,73 a Supreme Court decision which denied
the use of in pari delicto to an antitrust situation. However, each
court considered Perma Life in different degrees and applied it in
different ways. For example, Kuehnert, in citing Perma Life, sum-
marily stated that antitrust law is an exception to the rule that
actual illegal conduct should bar recovery." The Nathanson court
maintained that Perma Life indicated a strong suggestion of the
unavailability of the defense in securities violations.75 This conclu-
sion was reached despite the fact that the Perma Life plaintiff was
coerced into joining an illicit agreement, whereas the Nathanson
plaintiff voluntarily acted upon inside information. Lastly, Tarasi
considered Perma Life to be central to its discussion and interpreted
it as denying recovery only when the fault of the plaintiff was sub-
stantially equal to that of the defendant."
The different results reached in each of these cases may be ex-
plained by different interpretations of the policies underlying both
antitrust law and rule 10b-5. A review of the Perma Life opinion as
well as the lower court decisions77 that have considered Perma Life
indicate that the proper interpretation is to permit the defense of
in pari delicto when the parties are equally responsible for the ille-
gality. Further, an examination of the underlying policies of anti-
trust law and rule 10b-5 will reveal that substantial similarities
72. Id.
73. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
74. 412 F.2d at 703.
75. 325 F. Supp. at 56.
76. 555 F.2d at 1161.
77. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text infra.
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existing between the two justify the application of Perma Life and
its progeny to a 10b-5 setting.
A. Perma Life and its Progeny
In Perma Life, individual dealers of Midas, Inc. alleged that the
sales agreement which they entered into with Midas violated section
one of the Sherman Act,7" section three of the Clayton Act, 7 and the
Robinson-Patman Act.8° Specifically the agreement barred the deal-
ers from purchasing mufflers from other sources, prevented them
from selling outside the designated territory, tied the sale of muf-
flers to the sale of other products in the Midas line, and required
the dealers to sell these products at fixed retail prices."
Both the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois 2 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit 3 held that the petitioner was barred by in pari delicto. They
maintained that the dealers had accepted the Midas franchises vol-
untarily and with full knowledge of the restrictions.8 4 However, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts of Perma Life did
not suggest any basis for applying the in pari delicto doctrine85
78. Section one of the Sherman Act provides that every contract, combination, or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade is declared illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
79. Section three of the Clayton Act lists activities in which a party may not engage it'
the effect of such engagement is "to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
80. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price and service discrimination without offering
the same advantages to all customers. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
81. 392 U.S. at 137.
82. In an unreported opinion the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois entered its order on May 24, 1966, sustaining the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on all counts.
83. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd,
392 U.S. 134 (1968).
84. Id. at 699.
85. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In Simpson the plaintiff leased a Union Oil
gas station for one year. The lease required him to receive Union Oil products on consignment
and sell them at prices determined by Union Oil. Because the plaintiff refused to follow the
prescribed prices, his lease was not renewed. The Court, in considering the plaintiff's suit,
permitted damages incurred as a result of the refusal to renew and additionally profits lost
by following the price schedules. Underlying the court's allowance of the latter damages was
its belief that the plaintiff was "coerced into the agreement." 377 U.S. at 16, 22, 24.
In Kiefer-Stewart, the plaintiff charged that the defendants, Calvert and Seagram corpora-
tions, conspired to sell only to those Indiana wholesalers who would resell at prices fixed by
Seagram and Calvert. Although the Court recognized that the plaintiff may have conspired
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Noting that the law encourages a reprehensible antitrust plaintiff
to file suit because this furthers the overriding public policy in favor
of competition,"6 the Supreme Court concluded that in pari delicto
was not a defense to an antitrust action. 7 The Court premised its
decision on the conclusion that the dealer's participation in the
schemes was not voluntary in any meaningful sense.8 Justice Black,
writing the majority opinion,89 recognized that many of the clauses
in the agreement were detrimental to the dealers and that the deal-
ers, to obtain the lucrative franchises, did not acquiesce voluntar-
ily °.0 More importantly, Justice Black limited his initial ban of the
defense by stating that the decision did not attempt to decide
whether active participation and support of an illegal scheme would
bar a plaintiffs antitrust cause of action."
This "limiting language" of Justice Black, as well as the support-
ing opinions of the other members of the Court," have caused the
lower courts to temper the initial abolition of the in pari delicto
with other wholesalers to set minimum prices for the liquor, the Court concluded that the
alleged illegal conduct of the plaintiffs could not legalize the unlawful actions of the defen-
dants. 340 U.S. at 214.
86. But see Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent As Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78
HARv. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1965), [hereinafter cited as In Pari Delicto and Consent], where
it was concluded that little public benefit would be gained in allowing plaintiffs to recover
when they participate in an illegal venture. Additionally, it was stated that allowing suit
would have the effect of encouraging a co-conspirator who becomes disenchanted with the
scheme to cut himself loose.
87. 392 U.S. at 140.
88. As to what constitutes being coerced into an agreement, see In Pari Delicto and
Consent, supra note 85, at 1245-46.
89. Justices White, Fortas, and Marshall each wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice
Harlan, speaking for both himself and Justice Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in
part. Justice White would deny recovery where there was "equal responsibility" for the
violation. 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring). Justice Fortas argued that in pari delicto
was inapplicable to the present case but indicated that it would be applicable where the
parties were coadventurers or partners in the violative arrangements. Id. at 148 (Fortas, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall concluded that in pari delicto was applicable where the plain-
tiff actively participated in the scheme. Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Harlan
and Stewart concluded that plaintiffs truly in pari delicto should be barred, id. at 153, but
recognized that a plaintiff who consented to an unlawful agreement, was coerced into the
agreement, or committed independent unlawful agreement, was not truly in pari delicto. Id.
at 154-55 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
90. Later in the opinion Justice Black refers to the illegal scheme as being "thrust upon"
the plaintiffs. Id. at 141.
91. Id. at 140. The difficulty in determining the precise holding of Perma Life was dis-
cussed in The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 260 (1968).
92. See note 89 supra.
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defense. Although the lower courts generally agree that the defense
remains viable in antitrust law, 3 they are struggling to determine
what degree of involvement 4 by the plaintiff should bar his cause
of action. For example in Premier Electric Construction Co. v.
Miller-Davis Co.,95 Perma Life was interpreted as holding that
plaintiffs who do bear equal responsibility to the illegal scheme
should be barred from recovery by in pari delicto.9 But the Miller-
Davis interpretation failed to clarify what encompassed "equal re-
sponsibility." Other courts have emphasized that to bar the plain-
tiff's recovery his participation must be in the formulation stage of
the conspiracy. 7 Perhaps the most unique interpretation of Perma
Life was established by the Ninth Circuit in Javelin Corp. v. Uni-
93. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text infra.
94. See Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977). See note 98 and
accompanying text infra.
95. 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970). In Miller Davis, a general contractor induced a subcon-
tractor to submit higher bids to the general's competitors and assured the subcontractor that
it in return would receive the subcontract. Because the general contractor did not award the
subcontract, to the "assured" subcontractor, suit was filed under the Sherman Act. Although
the Seventh Circuit voted that this agreement constituted a concerted refusal to deal and thus
a per se violation of the Sherman Act, it remanded the cases to determine key factual
inquiries relative to the in pari delicto defense. Among these questions were whether the
plaintiff was required by economic pressure to accept the agreement and which party initi-
ated the unlawful provisions. 422 F.2d at 1138.
96. See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Company, 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977). In
Lamp Liquors, the defendant, a beer manufacturer and others, discontinued selling beer to
the plaintiff who in turn would resell the beer- to others. The plaintiff contended that ,this
vertical restraint on trade was a per se violation. Although the court disagreed, id. at 432, it
stated that the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's reselling of the beer contrary to a state
statute did not participate in any illegal scheme with the defendant; the plaintiff's alleged
violation of state law had only a slight relationship to the transaction. Id. at 431.
97. See South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). In South-East Coal, the defendant contended that the
plaintiff's approval and endorsement of an unlawful arrangement which was designed to
restrain trade invoked the doctrine of in pari delicto. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
trial court's charge on in pari delicto, that the plaintiff must be a co-initiator of the conspiracy
for the defense to apply, was appropriate. Id. at 783-84.
See also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). Columbia
Nitrogen was a breach of contract action with an antitrust counterclaim. The essence of the
counterclaim was that Columbia, a producer of phosphate, had engaged in reciprocal dealing
(the use of buying power to secure an advantage in the sale of one's product), 451 F.2d at 13,
by exerting economic leverage through its purchase of nitrogen from Columbia to coerce
Columbia to sign the phosphate contract. The court held that a party who voluntarily formu-
lates and equally participates in a non-c6ercive reciprocal agreement cannot maintain an
action under the Sherman Act. Id. at 16.
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royal Corp.98 In Javelin, the court adopted a causation standard"
and concluded that the mandate of Perma Life was to bar recovery
only when the illegal conspiracy would not have been formed but
for the plaintiff's participation.00
B. Application of the Perma Life Line of Decisions to 10b-5
The application of the Perma Life line of decisions to 10b-5 rests
upon the similar policies underlying the private enforcement of rule
10b-5 and antitrust law. 01 In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,'"I the Supreme
Court observed that private enforcement provided a necessary sup-
plement to governmental enforcement'03 and a private right of ac-
tion was available when necessary to achieve the results of the se-
curities acts.0 4 Similarly, the Perma Life Court maintained that the
purposes of antitrust laws would be best served by insuring that
private action will be a continuing threat to deter potential antitrust
violators.0 5 Thus, in both situations, private litigation serves a de-
terrence function and encourages injured parties to expose violators
to the public.0°
Moreover, the degree of public interest in both areas appears to
be equivalent. The fact that antitrust law provides for treble dam-
ages, while rule 10b-5 does not, is insignificant. The reason for the
treble damage provision is to offset the potential plaintiff's fear of
retribution from the defendant who is often dealing in the same
98. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976). In Javelin, the plaintiff entered the defendant's distribu-
torship group after the group had been in existence for five years. The group imposed unlaw-
ful, territorial restraints on its members as well as requiring the members to enter in unlawful
tie-in agreements requiring the members to buy the defendant's stock. Applying the "but for"
standard the court concluded that the plaintiff's degree of participation fell well short of
barring its claim. Id. at 280.
99. In adopting that standard the Javelin court stated that it agreed with Justice White's
concurring opinion that the problem of who is entitled to recover is one of degree of responsi-
bility posing the issue of causation in particularized form. 546 F.2d at 279-80 n.3.
100. Id. at 279.
101. See Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc. 325 F. Supp. 50, 56 n.30 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See notes 26-33 and accompanying text supra.
102. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
103. Id. at 432.
104. Id.
105. 392 U.S. at 139.
106. See Note, 5 GA. L. REV. 166, 177 (1970), where the author compares the policy of
antitrust with that of the Securities Exchange Act in dealing with the margin requirements.
See notes 45-46 supra.
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market.°7 The 10b-5 plaintiff possesses no such fear. This equality
is further evidenced by the Borak Court's failure to delineate any
differing degree of public interest in its analogy that as in antitrust
treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damage on injunc-
tive relief served as a most effective weapon.0 8
IM. CONCLUSION
Though the courts have been inconsistent in their application of
the in pari delicto defense, it is suggested that the soundest ap-
proach is to allow the defense. This result may at first appear to
implicitly suggest that deterrence, as a policy consideration, unjus-
tifiably overrides the policy of allowing the investing public to re-
cover when wronged." 9 However, a close examination of the legisla-
tive intent in enacting the securities act, as well the SEC's intent
in promulgating 10b-5, shows that this implication is invalid.
Generally, in enacting the securities act the legislature intended
to insure fairness in securities transactions."0 Specifically, rule 10b-
5 was promulgated with the expectation that all investors will have
equal access to material information."' The intent of these two
governmental bodies show that only innocent parties should be
given the right to recover. To do otherwise would allow a tippee-
plaintiff to benefit from his wrongdoing; this latter result is not
onl y unfair, but would encourage parties to seek inside informa-
tion which runs contrary to the notion of equal access of informa-
tion. Thus, this discussion shows that by permitting only innocent
investor-shareholders to recover, the two 10b-5 policy considerations
are not really conflicting, but, in fact, complement each other by
deterring wrongdoers but, at the same time, allowing innocent
investors to recover when wronged.
107. See Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regula-
tory Schemes, 60 CAUF. L. REV. 572, 573 n.6 (1972). For a discussion of the objectives behind
treble damages, see MacIntyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7
ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 114-15 (1962); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Govern-
ment's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061, 1062 (1954).
108. 377 U.S. at 432.
109. See notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text supra.
110. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
111. See Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966); Fleischer,
Securities Trading a Corporation Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulfur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1278-80 (1965).
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Moreover, recognition of the defense implies that tippers and tip-
pees are equally at fault and that the public interest will be fur-
thered. It has been suggested that these implications are valid.
First, the parties share an equal propensity to release the informa-
tion and only through the illegal action of both will harm emanate
to the investing public. Secondly, the public interest will be fur-
thered by recognition of the defense since it will deter tippees from
relying on any and all tips while nonrecognition will only deter a
tipper's release of false tips.
Lastly, the Perma Life line of decisions supports the application
if in pari delicto in 10b-5 suits. While Perma Life itself denied the
defense, it has not been interpreted as a per se abolition of in pari
delicto in any antitrust situation. Rather, the lower courts, although
disagreeing as to what constitutes equality of fault, indicate that
the defense remains viable. Thus, because of similar policies under-
lying private enforcement of rule 10b-5 and antitrust law, that of
encouraging injured parties to expose violators to the public, this
continued viability of in pari delicto ought to be extended to rule
10b-5 situations.
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